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Abstract—Wyner’s soft-covering lemma is a valuable tool
for achievability proofs of information theoretic security, resolv-
ability, channel synthesis, and source coding. The result herein
sharpens the claim of soft-covering by moving away from an
expected value analysis. Instead, a random codebook is shown to
achieve the soft-covering phenomenon with high probability. The
probability of failure is doubly-exponentially small in the block-
length, enabling more powerful applications through the union
bound.
I. CLAIM
Given a channel QV |U and an input distribution QU , let
the output distribution be QV . Also, let the n-fold memoryless
extensions of these be denoted QV n|Un , QUn , and QV n .
Wyner’s soft-covering lemma [1, Theorem 6.3] says that
the distribution induced by selecting a Un sequence at random
from an appropriately chosen set and passing this sequence
through the memoryless channel QV n|Un will be a good
approximation of QV n in the limit of large n as long as the
set is of size greater than 2nR where R > I(U ;V ). In fact,
the set can be chosen quite carelessly—by random codebook
construction, drawing each sequence independently from the
distribution QUn .
The soft-covering lemmas in the literature use a distance
metric on distributions (commonly total variation or relative
entropy) and claim that the distance between the induced
distribution PV n and the desired distribution QV n vanishes
in expectation over the random selection of the set.1 In the
literature, [2] studies the fundamental limits of soft-covering as
“resolvability,” [3] provides rates of exponential convergence,
[4] improves the exponents and extends the framework, [5] and
[6, Chapter 16] refer to soft-covering simply as “covering” in
the quantum context, [7] refers to it as a “sampling lemma”
and points out that it holds for the stronger metric of relative
entropy, and [8] gives a recent direct proof of the relative
entropy result.
Here we give a stronger claim. With high probability
with respect to the set construction, the distance will vanish
exponentially quickly with the block-length n. The negligible
probability of the random set not producing this desired result
is doubly-exponentially small.
Let us define precisely the induced distribution. Let C =
{un(m)}Mm=1 be the set of sequences, which will be referred
to as the codebook. The size of the codebook is M = 2nR.
Then the induced distribution is:
PV n|C = 2
−nR
∑
un(m)∈C
QV n|Un=un(m). (1)
1Many of the theorems only claim existence of a good codebook, but all
of the proofs use expected value to establish existence.
Lemma 1. For any QU , QV |U , and R > I(U ;V ), where V
has a finite support V , there exists a γ1 > 0 and a γ2 > 0
such that for n large enough
P
(
d(PV n|C , QV n) > e
−γ1n
)
≤ e−e
γ2n
, (2)
where d(·, ·) is the relative entropy.
Proof: We state the proof in terms of arbitrary dis-
tributions (not necessarily discrete). When needed, we will
specialize to the case that V is finite.
Let the Radon-Nikodym derivative between the induced
and desired distributions be denoted as
DC(v
n) ,
dPV n|C
dQV n
(vn). (3)
In the discrete case, this is just a ratio of probability mass
functions.
Notice that the relative entropy of interest, which is a
function of the codebook C, is given by
d(PV n|C , QV n) =
∫
dPV n|C logDC . (4)
Define the jointly-typical set over u and v sequences by
Aǫ ,
{
(un, vn) :
1
n
log
dQV n|Un=un
dQV n
(vn) ≤ IQ(U ;V ) + ǫ
}
.
(5)
We split PV n|C into two parts, making use of the indicator
function denoted by 1. Let ǫ > 0 be arbitrary, to be determined
later.
PC,1 , 2
−nR
∑
un(m)∈C
QV n|Un=un(m)1(V n,un(m))∈Aǫ , (6)
PC,2 , 2
−nR
∑
un(m)∈C
QV n|Un=un(m)1(V n,un(m))/∈Aǫ . (7)
The measures PC,1 and PC,2 on the space Vn are not proba-
bility measures, but PC,1 + PC,2 = PV n|C for each codebook
C.
Let us also split DC into two parts:
DC,1(v
n) ,
dPC,1
dQV n
(vn), (8)
DC,2(v
n) ,
dPC,2
dQV n
(vn). (9)
By Jensen’s inequality (or the data processing inequality)
we can upper bound the relative entropy of interest:
d(PV n|C, QV n) ≤ h
(∫
dPC,1
)
. . .
+
∫
dPC,1 logDC,1 +
∫
dPC,2 logDC,2,
(10)
where h(·) is the binary entropy function.
Notice that PC,1 will usually contain almost all of the
probability. That is, denoting the complement of Aǫ as Aǫ,∫
dPC,2 = 1−
∫
dPC,1 (11)
= 2−nR
∑
un(m)∈C
PQ
(
Aǫ | U
n = un(m, C)
)
. (12)
This is an average of exponentially many i.i.d. random vari-
ables bounded between 0 and 1. Furthermore, the expected
value of each one is the exponentially small probability of
correlated sequences being atypical:
E PQ
(
Aǫ | U
n = un(m, C)
)
= PQ
(
Aǫ
) (13)
≤ 2−βn, (14)
where
β = max
α>1
(α− 1) (IQ(U ;V ) + ǫ − dα(QU,V , QUQV )) ,
(15)
where dα(·, ·) is the Re´nyi divergence of order α. We use
units of bits for mutual information and Re´nyi divergence to
coincide with the base two expression of rate.
Therefore, the Chernoff bound assures that
∫
dPC,2 is
exponentially small. That is, for any β1 < β,
P
(∫
dPC,2 ≥ 2 · 2
−β1n
)
≤ e−
1
32
n(R−β1)
. (16)
Similarly, DC,1 is an average of exponentially many i.i.d.
and uniformly bounded functions, each one determined by one
sequence in the codebook:
DC,1(v
n) = 2−nR
∑
un(m)∈C
dQV n|Un=un(m)
dQV n
(vn)1(vn,un(m))∈Aǫ
(17)
For every term in the average, the indicator function bounds
the value to be between 0 and 2nI(U ;V )+nǫ. The expected
value of each term with respect to the codebook is bounded
above by one, which is observed by removing the indicator
function. Therefore, the Chernoff bound assures that DC,1 is
exponentially close to one for every vn. For any β2:
P
(
DC,1(v
n) ≥ 1 + 2−β2n
)
≤ e−
1
32
n(R−IQ(U;V )−ǫ−2β2)
∀vn.
(18)
This use of the Chernoff bound has been used before for a
soft-covering lemma in the proof of Lemma 9 of [5].
At this point we will use the fact that V is a finite set to
obtain two bounds. First,
DC,2(v
n) ≤
(
max
v∈V
1
QV (v)
)n
∀vn ∈ Vn w.p.1. (19)
Notice that the maximum is only over the support of V , which
makes this bound finite. The reason this restriction is possible
is because with probability one a conditional distribution is
absolutely continuous with respect to its associated marginal
distribution.
Next we use the union bound applied to (14) and (18),
taking advantage of the fact that the space Vn is only expo-
nentially large. Let S be the set of codebooks such that all of
the following are true:∫
dPC,2 < 2 · 2
−β1n, (20)
DC,1(v
n) < 1 + 2−β2n ∀vn ∈ Vn, (21)
DC,2(v
n) <
(
max
v∈V
1
QV (v)
)n
∀vn ∈ Vn. (22)
We see that the probability of not being in S is doubly
exponentially small:
P(C /∈ S) ≤ e−
1
3 2
n(R−β1)
+ |V|ne−
1
3 2
n(R−IQ(U;V )−ǫ−2β2)
.
(23)
What remains is to show that for every codebook in S, the
relative entropy is exponentially small. We begin from (10).
Since
h(x) ≤ x log
e
x
, (24)
we have
h
(∫
dPC,1
)
= h
(∫
dPC,2
)
(25)
≤ 2 · 2−β1n(β1n log 2 + log e− log 2). (26)
Furthermore,∫
dPC,1 logDC,1 ≤
∫
dPC,1 log(1 + 2
−β2n) (27)
≤ log(1 + 2−β2n) (28)
≤ 2−β2n log e. (29)
Finally,∫
dPC,2 logDC,2 ≤
∫
dPC,2 log
(
max
v∈V
1
QV (v)
)n
(30)
≤ n log
(
max
v∈V
1
QV (v)
)∫
dPC,2 (31)
≤ n log
(
max
v∈V
1
QV (v)
)
2 · 2−β1n. (32)
Note: Relative entropy can be used to bound total variation
via Pinsker’s inequality. With that approach you lose a factor
of two in the exponent of decay. On the other hand, the last
steps of the proof can be modified to produce a total variation
bound instead of relative entropy. This direct method keeps
the error exponents the same for the total variation case as it
is for relative entropy.
II. APPLICATIONS
This stronger version of Wyner’s soft-covering lemma has
important applications, particularly to information theoretic
security. The main advantage of this lemma comes from the
union bound.
The usual random coding argument for information theory
uses a randomly generated codebook until the final steps of the
achievability proof. In this final step, it is claimed that there
exists a good codebook based on the analysis. This can be done
by analyzing the expected value of the performance for the
random ensamble and claiming that at least one codebook is
as good as the expected value. Alternatively, one can make the
argument based on the probability that the randomly generated
codebook has a good performance. If that probability is greater
than zero, then there is at least one good codebook. The
second approach can be advantageous when performance is
not captured by one scalar value that is easily analyzed—
for example, if “good” performance involves a collection of
constraints.
This stronger soft-covering lemma gives a very strong
assurance that soft-covering will hold. Even if the codebook
needs to satisfy exponentially many constraints related to soft-
covering, the union bound will yield the claim that a codebook
exists which satisfies them all simultaneously. Indeed, if you
ran the soft-covering experiment exponentially many times,
regardless of how the codebooks are correlated from one
experiment to the next, the probability of seeing even one fail
is still doubly-exponentially small.
A. Semantic Security
Wyner’s soft-covering lemma has become a standard tool
for proving that strong perfect secrecy is achieved in the wire-
tap channel (see e.g. [9]). Coincidentally, Wyner introduced
both the idea of soft covering [1] and the wiretap channel [10]
in the same year, but he didn’t connect the two together.
According to the usual definition, strong perfect secrecy is
achieved if the mutual information (unnormalized) between the
message and the eavesdropper’s channel output can be made
arbitrarily small.
An even stronger notion of near-perfect secrecy is se-
mantic security. This requires that any two messages cannot
be distinguished, usually measured by total variation. This
is not implied by the above strong secrecy because mutual
information is an average quantity. Since there are so many
messages, the mutual information can be small even if a few
of the messages are perfectly distinguishable.
Semantic security is an operationally relevant metric and
widely adopted in cryptography. In [11] it is shown that
semantic security is essentially equivalent to stipulating that
the capacity of the channel from the transmitted message to
the eavesdropper’s observations is negligible, rather than the
mutual information with respect to a uniformly distributed
message. They also show that for some binary channels
semantic security can be achieved at rates up to Wyner’s
secrecy capacity. Note that contrary to the claim in [12], it
is not sufficient to analyze the random codebook ensemble for
an arbitrary message distribution in order to claim semantic
security. A single codebook must work well for all message
distributions.
The soft-covering lemma is used in the proof of the wiretap
channel in the following way. A random codebook is used for
communication to the intended receiver; however, two digital
messages are concatenated and fed into the encoder (mapped
to the codewords): the actual message to be transmitted; and a
random sequence of bits. This random sequence of bits is what
provides the secrecy. Since the sequence is random, this means
that for any individual transmitted message there is a collection
of codewords from which one is selected uniformly at random
and transmitted. The soft-covering lemma says that the output
at the eavesdropper will look i.i.d. if the size of this set if large
enough. More importantly, this i.i.d. output distribution does
not depend on the message that was transmitted.
This argument, using the standard soft-covering lemma
(expectation with respect to the codebook), is good enough
to claim that the output distribution is close to the i.i.d.
distribution on average over the messages. This can then be
used to claim that the mutual information is small. However,
for semantic security, it must be claimed that the output
distribution is close the i.i.d. distribution for all messages,
and there are exponentially many messages. Here is where
the stronger soft-covering lemma provided in this work is
advantageous. Using the stronger lemma we can claim that
a single codebook exists that accomplishes this for every
message.
For the single-transmitter wiretap setting, semantic security
can be achieved by other means. The expurgation technique
that is used to bound the maximum error probability in channel
coding can be used here. Any offending messages, which do
not produce the desired output distribution at the eavesdropper,
can be removed from the codebook, and this can be shown
to only negligibly reduce the message rate. However, this
expurgation technique will not work in all setting, such as
the multiple access wiretap channel. On the other hand, the
proof method involving this stronger soft-covering lemma will
work in that setting. Thus, strong secrecy can be upgraded to
semantic security even in situations where vanishing average
error probability cannot be upgraded to vanishing maximum
error probability.
B. Distributed Channel Synthesis
In previous work [4], we characterized the minimum rates
of communication and common randomness needed to syn-
thesize a memoryless channel, where the channel inputs are
observed at the location of the transmitter, and the channel
outputs are produced at the location of the receiver. This
is referred to as distributed channel synthesis. We say that
synthesis is achieved if it is not possible to distinguish the
synthetic channel from the genuine memoryless channel that
it mimics upon observing the channel inputs and outputs.
The work in [4] only considers the case where the input is
a fixed i.i.d. distribution. A stronger claim would be to say that
the synthetic channel cannot be distinguished from the genuine
channel even for arbitrary inputs (perhaps with a statistical
constraint).2 However, the proof in [4] relies heavily on the
2This stronger claim was shown independently in the work of [13] using
an entirely different proof.
soft-covering lemma, and the exponential size of even a single
type of input sequences made such a claim elusive. A single
codebook would need to work well for all input sequences,
but the soft-covering lemma only showed that it would work
well on average.
With this stronger soft-covering lemma, it may be possible
to use the union bound to claim that the soft-covering phe-
nomenon will hold for all of the channel inputs simultaneously.
C. Wiretap Channel II
The wiretap channel has been studied in other forms aside
from the memoryless channel setting. One such variation,
where the eavesdropper gets to make choices about his own
channel noise, has been referred to as the Wiretap Channel
II [14]. The original formulation was a channel where the
eavesdropper is allowed to decide which transmission packets
to observed while being limited in quantity. If the selection
of observed packets is an i.i.d. process, then this is the
standard wiretap channel setting with an erasure channel to
the eavesdropper. The secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel
type II, where the eavesdropper selects the packets to observe,
was solved in [14] only for the case of a noise-free channel to
the legitimate receiver. Recent work [15] investigates the case
where the channel to the legitimate receiver is also noisy, for
which the secrecy capacity is yet unknown.
The challenge in this setting is that the eavesdropper knows
the codebook when it selects the packets to observe. Therefore,
secrecy will only be achieved if it is achieved uniformly for all
selections of packets, of which there are exponentially many
possibilities.
Using the lemma provided in this work, it can be shown
that rates all the way up to the secrecy capacity of the memory-
less erasure channel can be achieved even in this more stringent
setting. The codebook construction for the wiretap channel
is symmetric in time, so the secrecy analysis, with respect
to the random codebook, does not depend on the specific
choice of packets observed. The remaining step that is needed
is to show that a single codebook exists which will provide
secrecy simultaneously for each one of the exponentially many
observation sequences. This is what the stronger soft-covering
lemma provides.
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